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not choose to apply it in this instance, and the decisions of the New
York courts have been given no weight or effect.
Since, then, the legalisms of the situation tip justice's scales in
favor of the case for effective civil service, and since, certainly, the
equities are all on this side of the issue, it is to be regretted that the
Supreme Court of Ohio has failed to play an effective role as "watch-
dog" over Art. XV, §Io of the Ohio Constitution.
GERALD 0. ALLEN
FRANK R. STRONG.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO REGULATE DISTRIBUTION OF
COMMERCIAL HANDBILLS
Plaintiff, refused permission by New York City officials to dock
his submarine for exhibition off Battery Park, obtained a permit to
dock at a state-owned pier. A handbill was prepared containing a
cut of the submarine, a directional map, directions to see featured
points of the sub under competent guide service, and a schedule of
"popular prices." Informed by police that distribution of the hand-
bill would be illegal under Sec. 318 U. Y. C. Sanitary Code,' plaintiff
then printed a second handbill, substantially the same on one side,
except that for the admission price schedule and guide-service refer-
ences there was substituted a statement of the exhibit's uniqueness
and a general description of what the submarine contained. On the
other side, however, it carried a protest against city's refusal to grant
a dock permit, mentioning that the sub could be seen by following
the map on the reverse side. On being notified that street distribu-
tion of this handbill also was prohibited, but that the protest could
be distributed if the "commercial advertising matter on its face were
X L. Y. C. Sanitary Code sec. 318: "No person shall throw, cast or distribute or
cause or permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet,
placard or other advertising matter whatsoever, in or upon any street or public place, or
in a front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the vestibule or any hall of any
building or in a letter box therein; provided that nothing herein contained shall be deemed
to prohibit or otherwise regulate the delivery of any such matter by the United States
Postal Service, or prohibit the distribution of sample copies of newspapers regularly
'old by the copy or annual subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the
lawvful distribution of anything other than commercial and business advertising matter."
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removed," plaintiff petitioned the United States District Court to
enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance. On appeal from the grant-
ing of the injunction,2 the Circuit Court of AppealsO affirmed, hold-
ing that distribution of a combined protest and advertisement, not
shown to be a mere subterfuge, cannot be prohibited. On certiorari
to the Supreme Court, held, reversed. Control of commercial ad-
vertising on the streets is a matter for legislative judgment, and
where the affixing of a protest to an advertising circular was with
the intent and purpose of evading the prohibition of the ordinance,
distribution of the handbill may be prohibited. Valentine v. Chresten-
senl, 315 U. S. 604 (1942).
Violative of the free-speech protection now found in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, anti-littering ordi-
nances prohibiting the distribution of handbills upon the streets were
held invalid, in Schneider v. State,4 when applied to the distribution
of informative material on political, economic, or religious issues. A
distinction between commercial advertising and informative matter
of general public concern had previously been mader, permitting re-
straints on commercial advertising and reasonable regulation thereof
as not violative of the equal protection of the laws. Discrimination
within the field of commercial advertising, such as anti-price adver-
tising legislation,' however, had been held to violate the equal protec-
tion clause7 or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
234 Fed. Supp. 596 (1940).
3 Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
4308 U. S. 147 (1939). See Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 498 (1939). For a dis-
cussion of the field of handbill ordinances, see Linidsay, Council and Court: The Handbill
Ordinances, (1941) 39 MICH. L. REV. 561.
'Compare Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939), with San Francisco Shopping
News v. San Francisco, 69 F. (2d) 879 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 66
(1934); Sieroty v. Huntington Park, 111 Cal. App. 377, 295 Pac. 564 (1931); Goldblatt
Bros. Corp. v. East Chicago, 211 Ind 621, 6 N. E. (2d) 311 (1937); (1941) 19 MIcH.
L. REV. 570.
6Jones v. Bontempo, 137 Ohio St. 634, 32 N. E. (2d) 17 (1941); Regal Oil Co. v.
State, 123 N. J. L. 456, 10 A. (2d) 495 (1939); Needham et al. v. Proffitt - Ind. -, 41
N. E. (2d) 606 (1942); State ex rel. Booth et al. v. Beck Jewelry Enterprises, Inc., -
Ind. -, 41 N. E. (2d) 623 (1912). Note that these cases are subsequent to Schneider v.
State, yet are based on discrimination between, media of advertising or deprivation of
property rights either under Fed. or State due process clauses. Cf. Slome v. Godley, 304
Mass. 187, 23 N. E. (2d) 133 (1939) where anti-price advertising was upheld as reason-
able policy regulation, based also on Mass, constitutional authority to regulate adver-
tising. See note, (1940) 20 BOSTON U. L. REV. 345.
7 Ex parte Johns, 129 Tex. Crim. Rep. 487, 85 S. W. (2d) 709 (1935), and cases
supra note 6.
8 Cleveland Shopping News Co. v. Lorain, 37 Ohio L. R. 527 (1922); In re. ,Thomburg,
55 Ohio App. 229, 9 N. E. (2d) 516 (1936).
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Generally, in these cases, no mention of free speech was made.9 This
distinction between commercial and non-commercial, generated from
equal protection litigation, is now taken by the Supreme Court to
place commercial advertising, in toto, without the protective cloak
of free speech.
Commercial advertising 0 has been defined as matter exclusively
or primarily calculated to attract the attention and patronage of the
public to a commercial enterprise, i.e., one entered into primarily for
pecuniary gain.' 1 The application of this test to a given fact situa-
tion may be approached in two different ways. Determination of the
commercial or non-commercial character of a publication may be
attempted by objective or quantitative methods. 1 2 The presence or
absence of price mention,'1 the relative weight given informative
matters as against the purely commercial aspects 14 would, under such
a test, be determinative of the character. But such methods do not
meet the hybrid cases where the informative matter cannot easily be
separated from the commercial aspects or background.'1 Suggested
for these instances is the character-contents test, used in the principal
case, of the motive of the distributor. Whether the handbill is prima-
rily commercial depends, by this measure, on whether the profit mo-
tive' is the principal purpose"7 in the distribution.
These tests and the decision in the principal case, however, are
based on the assumption that there is a valid distinction between
commercial and non-commercial literature. It is questionable whether
'Sce, however, Jones v. Bontempo, 137 Ohio St. 634, 32 N. E. (2d) 17 (1941);
Needham et al. v. Proffitt, - Ind. -, 41 N. E. (2d) 606 Syllabus 3 (1942), where in-
validity was rested in part on violation of free speech.
"'See discussion and criticism thereof, of distinction between commercial and non-
commercial in Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F. (2d) 511, 515 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). But
see 2 WORDS A.ND PHRAeses (Perma Ed.) 616 et seq.
I' Motion pictures have not been held within the free speech guarantee as the pur-
pose of publication is the exhibitor's profit. Mutual Film Corp. v. Ind. Com. of Ohio,
236 U. S. 230 (1915) But see, Notes (1938) 5 Ouio S. L. J. 89.
"See Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F (2d) 511, at 515 (C. C. L. 2d, 1941).
13Admission prices stated but held not commercial: People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich.
2,8, 41 N. W. 275 (1889); People v. Loring and Green, (N. Y. Mag. Ct. 1933) (unre-
ported), noted (19 IN3) lxv. Juran. Assoc. BULL. No. 12 at 2. Admission price omitted
but held commercial; Valentine v. Chrestensen, 314 U. S. 601, S5 L. ed. 861 (1942).
"See Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F. (2d) 511 at 516, (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
Is Note (1940) 35 ILL. L. Rev. 90.
"OTest suggested (1941) 39 MIcH. L. REv. 561.
17Test suggested (1940) 35 ILL. L. REv. 90: "Yet by ascertaining the principal pur-
po.e intended by the distributor in each case, the proper classification should be accom-
plished without great difficulty."
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any distinction should be made.1s Illustrative of the questionability
is the decision in Jones v. Opelika."' Here though involving similar
facts as in Schneider v. State,20 and there held within the free-speech
protection, the Court sustained a license fee on the distribution of
religious literature where a charge was made for the literature.
Though apparently saying that religious literature was not, merely
because of the free-speech aspect, exempt from non-discriminatory
taxation, yet in the words of the majority, "It is because we view
these sales as partaking more of commercial than religious or educa-
tional transactions that we find the ordinances, as here presented,
valid."'21 The minority, remembering the decision in the Schneider
case, held that mere charging of a small sum to cover cost of printing
did not make the matter, otherwise non-commercial, commercial, and
therefore entitled to exemption from unreasonable restraint.
The majority have by this decision laid the foundation for the
tomplete emasculation of the effective protection of the Schneider
case. If profit motive excludes one's utterances from "sale" in the
intellectual market place, what is available for exchange in this,
democracy's most important market? Few indeed are those free of
the taint of profit motive or self-service. The politician extolling his
qualifications for public office, or business protesting the burden of
taxation and government intervention, are motivated in part by
desire for personal gain. A newspaper publisher is not wholly devoid
of covetousness for the "root of all evil."' 22 The presence of compara-
tive prices for identified products, in a handbill presenting arguments
on the controversial economic question of chain versus independent
merchant distributive systems, coupled with reference to the location
of the place of business of the publisher and calling attention to his
business, being in the field of economic endeavor of the publisher and
calling attention to his business, is published with the purpose of
attracting patronage. Yet the information on the relative advantage
of chain or independent merchant distribution is a matter of public
concern, just as in labor dispute picketing is to secure the demands
Is See, note (1938) 5 U. OF Cnsc. L. REV. 675, 676, criticizing the distinction: "What
is news of general nature as compared -with advertising?"
9315 U. S. , 10 U. S. L. Week 4462 (June 9, 1942).
-308 U. S. 147 (1939).
2'Jones v. Opelika, 315 U. S. , 10 U. S. L. Week 4462, 4464 (June 9, 1942).
22See, Lindsay, Council and Court: The Handbill Ordinancez (1941), 39 MscH. L.
REv. 561 at 595: "Whether or not commercial in nature it seems clear that the distri-
bution of newspapers should be exempted from the ordinances."
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of the union from the particular employer, even though the problem
of employee-employer relationship is a matter of public concern. The
labor situation has nevertheless been held within the protection of
free speech. 3 True, the chain merchant could circulate his handbills
without price mention, or lecture on chain advantages in a down-
town hall; but price and effective consumer contact being the bases
of his competitive advantage, these methods are the most effective
for proving his argument; just as picketing at the matrix of the
labor dispute is for labor more effective than hiring a hall for debate
on the abstract issue.2 4 So, too, anti-price-advertising legislation de-
prives the small merchant of his most effective plea for patronage.25
The principal case, with the protest involving an individual com-
plaint not of great public interest and the appeal for patronage being
separable from the protest, was an unfortunate test for the problem
of commercial versus non-commercial advertising. While the decision
was justified, still the differentiation of commercial advertising from
matters protected by free speech was unfortunate, as shown by Jones
v. Opelika case. The distinction having been made, however, it
would seem that where matters of public concern are published rela-
tive to matters in the particular field of the publisher, even though
there is some showing of personal concern and possibility of personal
advantage, there should nevertheless be a presumption in favor of it
being within the protection of free speech, that is, non-commrcial. 28
In balancing the more important right of free speech against the less
important police power of the cities to prevent littering of its streets,
or the porches of its citizens, any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the informative character of the publication.2
7
T. A. B.
F. F. V.
"'Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
2 See ibid at 104 et seq.
2 See note 6, supra.
Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F (2d) 511, at 515 et seq. (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
7 The Valentine and Opelika cases were decided under the federal constitution, the
anti-price advertising cases were, for the most part, decided under state constitutions. It
is possible therefore that protection of advertising and borderline cases may be found in
the state constitution. See Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540,
(1941) noted (1942) 8 Ono ST. L. J. 201, as an example of state court assertions of
freedom to interpret the state "due process" clause as it sees it.
